The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iran expressed with some confidence that Iran had in 2003 halted active work on building a nuclear warhead.

There are still questions on whether or not this is actually solid intelligence, but I assume for now that it is. It does not obviate our need to be cautious with Iran. We should be investing a great deal of resources into better intelligence, as well as active diplomacy with Iran. This includes the gamut of options from sanctions to bi-lateral talks. It does not, at this time, include military operations - in my opinion.

That being said, I found this article interesting. It coincides with my views on Iran generally and the course the US should take with regards to the NIE.

Foreign Policy: How has the release of the recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear program changed the tenor of the Iran debate?

Dmitri Trenin: It allows for a broader range of views. I think that the importance of this debate is not to discuss the technical issues, but rather to use the technical issues as a platform to a higher plane of strategizing about Iran. I’m not an American and I can only say so much being a foreigner, but I think the focus should be on U.S. policy, rather than on what Iran is doing. I am struck by people debating what Iran is doing, and not thinking enough, in all due respect, about what the United States should be doing. In other words, people are prepared to give Iran the initiative, rather than to seize the initiative.

FP: What’s the view from abroad about the new estimate?

DT: I think the view from here is that the intelligence community, heavily battered over Iraq, has thrown a monkey wrench into what they believe could be the possibility of another major blunder. [That possibility] is that strong-willed persons within the administration would persuade the president to finish business, and not pass the Iranian issue onto his successor. But there’s only so much that you can see from several thousand miles away from Washington.

The emphasis is mine. I point this out because I respect a view from this standpoint. Trenin holds views much in line with mine on several topics, and I am an American. Much to the distaste of some of my acquaintances, Trenin and I share views on Putin.

I predict emails and comments regarding Trenin’s motives, qualifications, or integrity, however, we often judge a person’s intelligence by the amount one agrees with us. Trenin is obviously a genius.

It is quite possible Iran has halted nuclear weapon construction in order to garner favor with the US. This does not mean to suggest Iran is going through any radical shift in ideals - but we have to focus on the goal of Iran in the Middle East. Iran wants to be the influence in that region. If America gains enough support in the international community, that goal is finished for Iran. Especially in light of the vast amounts of US money going into Iraq. Iran coming into the fold geopolitically, so to speak, is a possible strategy to ensure Iran is not bypassed as the Mid-East power base.

On the other hand - it this is going to take some very hard work to find out - this could just be a way of defusing the pressure being brought to bear on Iran, while they secretly finish their weapons work with enriched uranium.  Time, and hopefully better intelligence than we currently have, will tell.

Mike Huckabee mentioned that he gets foreign policy advice from Frank Gaffney.

He has, when asked about foreign policy advisers and policy wonks who influenced him, mentioned Frank Gaffney.

“I talk to Frank Gaffney,” he told Wolf Blitzer on Late Edition.

Last night on Hugh Hewitt’s show, Gaffney called Huckabee’s Iran views “cockamamie.”

Whoopsy!

It should be noted that Fred Thompson has already chided Huckabee on his policy idea on Iran.

Admiral Michael Mullen is the first CJCS to visit Israel in a decade. It appears Israel is greatly concerned about American political reaction to the most recent NIE on Iran.

 Israel thinks that an American National Intelligence Estimate about Iran’s nuclear weapons program, published in an unclassified version last week, is unduly optimistic and focuses too narrowly on the last stage of weapons development — the fashioning of a bomb out of highly enriched uranium.

Let’s remember, Iran has never stated they are no longer enriching uranium - they have actually refused to stop enriching uranium. The intelligence gathered for the NIE talks to whether or not Iran is likely pursuing the construction of a nuclear weapon, using the enriched uranium.

The Secretary General of the UN stated Iran must provide the United Nations with a confidence that their enrichment of uranium is  for civil, peaceful purpose.

Dec. 7 (Bloomberg) — Iran hasn’t proven to the world that it has been developing nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said today.

“We still do not have full confidence what the real intention of the Iranian government is up to as far as their nuclear programs,” Ban said in an interview.

Now, this is not going to be easy for Iran to do at all - I’m not sure how it is possible. There is certainly no way to prove you are only using enriched uranium as fuel in your power-generating reactors without a great deal of oversight. The level of oversight Iran has bristled at in the past. Inspections alone will not be enough to accomplish this. The implication here is the United Nations - certainly most western governments - are going to remain suspicious of a nation which opens its parliamentary sessions with “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”; which supports terrorist organizations; and which has materially contributed to activities to perpetuate instability in Iraq. This is especially difficult when the “vindicative proof” Iran has stopped making weapons is coming under question (again - enriched uranium is dual use - take the questions with a grain of salt).

My thinking is that this statement by Secretary-General Moon has less to do with the extent of Iran’s nuclear ambition and more to the intent of Iran’s geopolitics in general. I am not a nuclear materials expert, but it would seem Iran is in the same boat Iraq was in. They have dual-use programs which have the capacity to produce weapons. Since their rhetoric is extremely violent in nature, it must be reasonably assumed they intend to make good on their threats.

What might clear all of this up - inject some confidence in the international community - is for Iran to make some definitive overtures of peace. Sign a peace agreement with Israel or the United States - and offer to re-establish full diplomatic relations. Iran could display a “we are sovereign, Islamic, and in disagreement with much of your western values - yet we are a nation at peace” relationship within the international community and the burden of proof of their peaceful intentions for enriched uranium would diminish greatly.

However, that would be like asking the KKK to make an overture of good intent to the NAACP, wouldn’t it? Things like this don’t help much either.

People ask why President Bush and members of his administration are still talking about Iran as a security threat. There are several reasons:

• Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism
• Iran is still a potential threat strategically - the portions of the NIE we have seen relate to building warheads and bombs. They are still working on missile technology and enriching uranium.
• Iran is not necessarily the reason we need a missile shield, simply a reason that won’t make the Russians angry.

With Iran somewhat vindicated by the NIE, does the missile shield get axed? Potentially, but we’d better think about this.

Russian President Vladimir Putin

Protecting Europe and (mostly) the United States from Russia’s missile and strategic bomber capacity is still a good reason to have a missile shield deployed in Europe. It is easier, goepolitically speaking, to blame the need on Iran. Openly stating that Russia is a strategic threat to the peace and security of Europe and the United States would probably be a lot less popular than blaming Iran.

I recently wrote about changes in data driving changes in opinion or policy. Here is another example - although there is a slight difference in this instance.

The intelligence community in the Unites States rarely has indisputable evidence to present to our leaders. They operate in a world of indications that are “confidenced” based upon the quality and quantity of intelligence sources. From the NIE document, I took the major differences between the old data and the new.

In 2005, the intelligence community reported:

• Assess with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure, but we do not assess that Iran is immovable.
• We have moderate confidence in projecting when Iran is likely to make a nuclear weapon; we assess that it is unlikely before early-to-mid next decade.
• Iran could produce enough fissile material for a weapon by the end of this decade if it were to make more rapid and successful progress than we have seen to date.

Combine that with tough talk from a nation becoming increasingly theocratic and supportive of terrorist organizations, and you have a basis for a foreign policy concern about the Middle East becoming even more unstable than it already appears.

A recently published National Intelligence Estimate, based upon information gathered between 2005 and mid-2007, draws a different picture:

• Judge with high confidence that in fall 2003,Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.) Assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons. Judge with high confidence that the halt was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work. Assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.
• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely. We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.)
• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.

Notice the differences in language between the 2005 and 2007 estimates. The confidence of the judgment suggests a great deal more intelligence resources were able to contribute to the NIE. By no means does the NIE present proof that Iran is no longer pursuing nuclear weapons. This is an estimate based upon the US intelligence communities ability to detect through technology and human sources the presence of uranium enrichment activities and activity connected with securing nuclear material. However, unless a smoking gun emerges, the assessment is strong enough to warrant a different tack in working with Iran.

In any case, Iran benefits from the ability of not having a nuclear weapon, yet having everyone think they are close to being capable of producing one. What this gives Iran’s Ayatollahs is bargaining power and an elevated influence in the region. This also does not remove the fact that Iran is led by an extreme theocracy which hates the west and supports terrorism in the region to undermine peace between Israel and Palestinians - in the best case. Diplomacy itself seems woefully inadequate, but there is no case for pursuing a change from Iran by a threat of military force.

Here is a good question: Why did Iran halt its nuclear weapons program in 2003?