Iran and Nuclear Weapons Program

I recently wrote about changes in data driving changes in opinion or policy. Here is another example - although there is a slight difference in this instance.

The intelligence community in the Unites States rarely has indisputable evidence to present to our leaders. They operate in a world of indications that are “confidenced” based upon the quality and quantity of intelligence sources. From the NIE document, I took the major differences between the old data and the new.

In 2005, the intelligence community reported:

• Assess with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure, but we do not assess that Iran is immovable.
• We have moderate confidence in projecting when Iran is likely to make a nuclear weapon; we assess that it is unlikely before early-to-mid next decade.
• Iran could produce enough fissile material for a weapon by the end of this decade if it were to make more rapid and successful progress than we have seen to date.

Combine that with tough talk from a nation becoming increasingly theocratic and supportive of terrorist organizations, and you have a basis for a foreign policy concern about the Middle East becoming even more unstable than it already appears.

A recently published National Intelligence Estimate, based upon information gathered between 2005 and mid-2007, draws a different picture:

• Judge with high confidence that in fall 2003,Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.) Assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons. Judge with high confidence that the halt was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work. Assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.
• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely. We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.)
• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.

Notice the differences in language between the 2005 and 2007 estimates. The confidence of the judgment suggests a great deal more intelligence resources were able to contribute to the NIE. By no means does the NIE present proof that Iran is no longer pursuing nuclear weapons. This is an estimate based upon the US intelligence communities ability to detect through technology and human sources the presence of uranium enrichment activities and activity connected with securing nuclear material. However, unless a smoking gun emerges, the assessment is strong enough to warrant a different tack in working with Iran.

In any case, Iran benefits from the ability of not having a nuclear weapon, yet having everyone think they are close to being capable of producing one. What this gives Iran’s Ayatollahs is bargaining power and an elevated influence in the region. This also does not remove the fact that Iran is led by an extreme theocracy which hates the west and supports terrorism in the region to undermine peace between Israel and Palestinians - in the best case. Diplomacy itself seems woefully inadequate, but there is no case for pursuing a change from Iran by a threat of military force.

Here is a good question: Why did Iran halt its nuclear weapons program in 2003?