Serbianna: Thoughts on the Past Year

Original Post: Saturday, December 1, 2007 - http://www.serbianna.com/columns/averko/006.shtml

By Michael Averko

My August 21, Serbianna article “A Different Settlement Plan for Kosovo” prompted some private questioning of how the proposed suggestion could work. Shortly after the article’s release, I privately stated additional points to a select few. Relative to what was said on the idea of overlapping realities, is the high profile reality that both parties (Serbs and Albanians) remain at loggerheads. A hypothetical scenario where Kosovo will be simultaneously independent and a part of Serbia would include:

- The return of refugees.
- Kosovo having full UN and Olympic representation, with the understanding that as long as there’s a Serbia, Kosovo will remain a part of it. Ukraine and Belarus had UN delegations with full UN voting rights during the Soviet period. Puerto Rico (US territory), Taiwan (recognized by most as a part of China) and Hong Kong (recognized by all as a part of China) have their own Olympic delegations (Taiwan’s going under the name “Chinese Taipai”). Palestine, a present non-nation has its own Olympic and UN observer representation. In the hypothetical Kosovo instance, Kosovo’s residents can choose between representing Serbia or Kosovo.

- For consistency and fairness sake, Republika Srpska (the predominately Serb portion of Bosnia) would be offered the same option (in Republika Srpska’s instance, a continued affiliation with Bosnia and the status as an independent nation). Based on the existing circumstances, the whereabouts of Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic (two Bosnian Serbs leaders wanted by an overly politicized legal body, who are thought to be residing in either Republika Srpska and-or Serbia) isn’t a valid counter-argument against Republika Srpska’s inclusion. The dubious trio of Hasim Thaci, Ramush Haridnaj and Agim Ceku are considered acceptable leaders for Kosovo. Like Kosovo, Republika Srpska’s territory was part of former Yugoslavia. Unlike Kosovo, Republika Srpska has the status of a republic and shows itself capable of governing a multi-ethnic land at peace.

This settlement plan is close to the current one favoring very broad autonomy for Kosovo as it remains part of Serbia. The bottom line is that the Albanians want a nation, with the Serbs seeking Kosovo to remain part of Serbia. The above August 21, article and addendum work those two desires in a proposed settlement. As previously noted, this hypothetical plan isn’t enthusiastically endorsed by yours truly. Rather, it was thought out as alternative to break the diplomatic impasse.

On another issue, a somewhat bemusing exercise is to review the political psychoanalysis of what’s motivating Russia to sympathize with the Serb position on Kosovo. This take frequently assumes that the official Western slant is reasoned and without any need of rebuke. For newsworthy purposes, a perfectly legitimate story would individually study each of the disputed former Communist bloc territories respective claims for independence. Such a feature would compare the historical and human rights issues of these troubled lands. Rather than do this, outlets like The New York Times (”the paper of record”) will babble on about how Kosovo must become independent, while showing no willingness whatsoever to consider the view that one or more of the disputed lands have better claims for independence. A point that has been credibly detailed by others besides myself.

Concerning the subject of disputed territories, a recent Boston Globe editorial (November 20) provides a break from the kind of spin perpetuated by The New York Times (”the paper of record”). The Boston Globe editorial nevertheless falls short in critiquing the official American position on disputed territories. Suggestively lumping them altogether in the same category of equal independence claims is an oversimplification.

We’re told by American mass media elites and others that Russian mass media is restricted because its key outlets (the top three television stations) have limited views unlike other lesser influential media venues in Russia. How the bleep is this so radically different from the situation in the US? Kudos to Antiwar.com, Chronicles Magazine, Z-Magazine and some other valued news/commentary venues, comprising the left-right political spectrum. May they grow and prosper. For the moment, they’re unfortunately nowhere near as influential as ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, The New York Times, NPR/PBS and a host of other leading American news sources.

Moscow has its share of Western mass media personnel. One of them confidently told me that Russians are essentially brainwashed on a number of topics. This source said that anti-Serb acts are played up in Russian media unlike instances like “what happened” at Srebrenica. At that point, I was once again reminded of one of several aspects shared by Russians and Serbs. The frequent enough badgering given to them by condescendingly pious individuals, who often don’t know much about what they’re commenting on and are unwilling to engage in an honest dialogue. For them, it’s a simple matter of their being right with no room for disagreement. This carries great weight when such people occupy relatively influential media positions. Regarding Srebrenica, this Western mass media person didn’t have Nasir Oric’s murderous actions against Serbs in mind. Rather, it was the more discussed (in Western media) summary execution of Muslim males by some Serb forces stationed in Srebrenica. As for what happened in that instance, much remains factually unclear. This includes the 7000-8000 casualty claim made by anti-Serb sources covering that matter. Based on what’s factually known, the actual toll of that crime could be in the 2000-4000 range. Earlier, in the same town, Oric and his forces likely killed well over 1000 Serb civilians, including many women and children. Srebrenica saw Serb and non-Serb casualties related to collateral damage, armed combatants killed in action and summary executions. Western mass media have come to acknowledge previous Bosnian Civil War casualty figures as false. In addition to the Srebrenica issue, the Western media person I was corresponding with wouldn’t acknowledge earlier fallacies like the overly bloated Bosnian Civil War death toll figures of 200,000 and over. It was as if this individual was pre-programmed to believe an official view, minus the ability to follow-up on contrary points.

That Western media person has been in Russia for a lengthy period. For some, it’s quite difficult to shed the biases which they’ve grown accustomed to. He/she expressed a near blind trust in accepting what “credible” news organizations (Anglo-American mass media) say. I’m reminded about how the BBC covered a commemoration of Muslim dead in Republika Srpska. This feature showed angry Serbs protesting the ceremony. No explanation was given on what caused their anger. It left many viewers concluding that a good number of Serbs are extremists, unwilling to deal with a past war, for which they were largely at fault, as has been scripted in some influential circles. A more objective coverage of this event would’ve asked those Serbs what was on their minds. The answer would’ve been that international aid (much of it Western and from wealthy predominately Muslim countries) to Bosnia has done a good deal to rebuild Muslim property (in certain instances, building it where it never existed). Such aid isn’t granted to the same degree when it comes to the Serb community. There’s a now internationally accepted roundabout figure of 100,000 killed during the Bosnian Civil War. At least 30,000 of the casualties (if not more) were Serb in a three way civil war. A far cry from much of the reporting of the last decade.

Knowing about all this and talking about it exclusively in private company does little if anything to change the faulty spin. As long as the misinformation continues, there’s a legitimate need to continuously challenge it in as direct a manner as possible.

Croat Ustasha sympathizer/musician Marko Perkovic’s (AKA Thompson) entry into the US sparked justified outrage. The American spirit of free speech permitted Thompson to perform in the US. It was the right call. Not allowing Thompson in would heighten the chance of his becoming a martyr in the eyes of some. A 1977 landmark case supported the right of Nazis to congregate. New York, the site of one of Thompson’s concerts had previously hosted an American Nazi Party rally in the 1930s and a high profile event featuring Nation of Islam Minister Louis Farrakhan, at a time when he was at his height of political unpopularity with many (those two events were held at Madison Square Garden). Upon his entry into North America, there was critical commentary released about Thompson’s views.

Thompson’s beliefs include the notion of a Communist Serb dominated Yugoslavia oppressing innocent non-Serbs like the Croats (”Serbo-Communism”). As testament to their sense of fairness, Serbs are collectively good at acknowledging the mishaps of some in their community. Serbs tolerate B92, a television/radio/internet enterprise, which has benefited from Western sources like George Soros. Its bilingual Serb/English language web site, is where former American diplomat and current Croat resident William Montgomery lashes out at mainstream Serb views. The latter being far less extreme than the Croat honoring of Thompson and “Operation Storm” (the 1995 Croat ethnic cleansing of 150,000 Serbs from Krajina). Where’s the Croat version of B92 hosting Americans, who disagree with those expressions of support? Instead, Thompson performs to packed audiences in Croatia. The largest gathering included former Croat diplomat Miomir Zuzul. When stationed in America, Zuzul spoke out against “Serb nationalism.” He reminds me of some anti-Russian nationalist elements among Central and East Europeans, who seem to believe that their side is quite innocent of past and present wrongs.

Thompson and his supporters recollect the past in an overly chauvinistic manner, which glosses over several points. Like Hitler, the half-Croat/half Slovene Yugoslav Communist dictator Tito was a corporal on the side of the Central Powers during World War I, when Serbia was allied with the West and Russia. During World War II, the Nazis didn’t give Serbia the status of a nation like they did with Croatia. The Serbs didn’t have anything coming close to the Croat Ustasha run concentration camp in Jasenovac.

The Communist Yugoslav Tito era saw Kosovo granted “autonomy” within Serbia. The largely Serb inhabited Krajina region in Croatia didn’t receive the same status. This despite the Krajina Serbs not having the terrorist elements prevalent among some in Kosovo’s Albanian community. The post-Communist “radicalization” of the Krajina Serbs was undoubtedly influenced by several factors:

- The trauma they suffered at the hands of the Ustasha during World War II.

- The hypocritical Titoist granting of autonomy to Kosovo, but not Krajina.

- The sugar coating of the Ustasha period by Croatia’s first post-Communist government.

- Credible claims of Croat discriminatory actions against Serbs, just before the wars of the last decade in former Yugoslavia (this included a change in the Croat constitution, reducing the status of the Serb community).

A former Communist general in Franjo Tudjman served as Croatia’s president during the ethnic cleansing of Krajina Serbs in Operation Storm. At the time, the Croat officer corps included a current political leader in the Kosovo Albanian community (Agim Ceku).

Relative to Croatia’s dealing with Thompson and Operation Storm, is the sharp contrast in addressing bigoted extremism in Serbia. A small coterie of recent neo-Nazi extremist activity in Novi Sad was rebuked by the Serb masses. The mentioned neo-Nazi presence had a noticeable non-Serb -coming from outside of Serbia makeup. The “nationalist” Serb Radical Party joined the opposition to the neo-Nazi display.

In modern day political usage, the word “nationalist” has a negative connotation. When Western leaders pursue the perceived national interests of their respective countries, they aren’t referred to as nationalist. From time to time, the nationalist label can be found getting pegged on Serb Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Unlike others, some are given less sympathy for reasonably advocating their nation’s interests. How much more nationalist are the politics of the Serb Radical Party when compared to the Islamic fundamentalist view of the late Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic? Reference his World War II era support for the Bosnian Muslim SS Handschar division and 1970 issued “Islamic Declaration.” Rarely found elsewhere in American mass media, David Binder’s October 19, 2003 New York Times obituary column “Alija Izetbegovic, Ex-President of Bosnia Dies at 78” provides a good overview of Izetbegovic.

Hopefully, 2008 will bring better times.

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Michael Averko is a New York based independent foreign policy analyst and media critic. In addition to Serbianna, his commentary has appeared in the Action Ukraine Report, Eurasian Home, Intelligent.ru, Johnson’s Russia List, Reuters, Russia Blog, Siberian Light, The New York Times, The Russia Journal and The Tiraspol Times.